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REPLY

The Brief of the IRS is Inadequate and Misleadine: Taxpayer is frustrated hy the
IRS' response to his hrief. Taxpayer took considerable effort to frame and analyze the issues
involved in this case. As will be demonstrated, to the extent the IRS has responded at all, it
has largely skirted the issues and failed to address Taxpayer's points. Some of Taxpayer's
arguments have heen dismissed with flippant remarks. More distressing, the IRS has simply
ignored many of Taxpayer's most considered arguments. In so doing, the IRS has not only
reve.tled the weakness of its position but has failed in its duty to this Court to analyze and
discuss the issues.
For the IRS to prevail, it must persuade this Court that Section 6512(h)(3)(B) contains
all of the following unexpressed concepts:
(1) the mailing of a notice of deficiency by the IRS constitutes a "deemed claim" for

refund filed by the taxpayer;
(2) the "deemed claim" for refund is not in the form of a return, although the IRS
does not articulate just what form this "deemed claim" takes;
(3) the "deemed claim" for refund of the taxpayer cannot be amended by the taxpayer
or replaced by the taxpayer's actual return, even if filed within the general three-year
limitation period.
Section 6512(b)(3)(B) Does Not Contain a

·neemed Claim•

Concept: Taxpayer

argue1 that section 6512(h)(3)(B) does not contain a "deemed claim" concept. (TP Br. 15-

1

16)'

The IRS repeatedly states that the plain language of section 6512 means that the

mailing of a notice of deficiency by the IRS constitutes a "deemed claim" tor refund filed hy
the raxpayer. (IRS Br. 10, 13-16,19,21). The tlaw in this conclusion is that there is no
expr,!ss reference in the statute to a "deemed claim." Its existence is not required by the
plain meaning of the statute.

The IRS did not address the fact that Congress has copiously

employed the word "deemed" elsewhere in the Code, including in the sections immediately
prect!ding and following, making it unlikely that Congress inadvertently failed to use the term
in se::tion 6512. (TP Br. 16 ). Taxpayer can only conclude that the IRS has no response.

Any Deemed Claim Must Also be Deemed to be in the Form of a Return:
Alternatively, Taxpayer argued that if Congress intended that a notice of deficiency mailed by
the

n.s be a "deemed claim" for refund filed by the taxpayer,

the "deemed claim" he treated

as a ·ralid claim and therefore in the form of a return. (TP Br. I 6-18)
The IRS' response was to refer to Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-3(a)(5) which
provides that an income tax return showing an overpayment constitutes a claim for refund and
simply argue that the converse is not necessarily true. (IRS Br. 23). However, noticeably
absent from the IRS' brief are any 'references to Treas. Regs. § 301.6402-J(a)(l) and§
301.t402-2(b) both of which are more relevant to a determination of the composition of any
"deer:~ed

claim."

Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b) requires that a claim for refund set forth in detail the
same items that would appear on a return. (TP Br. 18). Nowhere in its brief does the IRS

"TP Br." refers to Taxpayer's opening brief and "IRS Br." refers to the brief of the
IRS.
2

inform this Court just what form the Taxpayer's "deemed claim" takes. For the IRS to
prev1il, this "deemed claim" must he a naked "non-claim" without the detailed statement of
income, deductions and credits that is required of a valid claim tor refund.
Most importantly, Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(l ), ignored hy the IRS, requires that
if, a:; here, a return has not heen previously filed, it must he filed on the appropriate tax
return form. (TP Br. 18). In effect, the IRS is asking this Court to believe that Congress
not only implied a "deemed claim" hut an invalid claim for refund. Is there any reason to
impt.te to Congress such an intent? The only advantage of reading this concept into the
statute is to give the IRS the power to confiscate refunds of overpayments from taxpayers
who~:e

only mistake is to elect the Tax Court as a forum for recovering their refund. The

only reasonable assumption is that Congress would not intend such a result unless it expressly
so suted. The fact that the Tax :ourt was created to assist taxpayers makes this assumption
all tl1e more logical. (TP Br. 34)
Therefore, this Court should conclude that any "deemed claim" for refund filed hy
the Taxpayer was embodied in a return as required hy the Treasury Regulations. He would
therefore have filed his claim for refund simultaneously with his return and have availed
himself of the three-year limitation of section 65ll(b)(2)(A).

Taxpayer's Actual Return Should Supersede or Amend any ·oeemed• Return:
In

th~

second alternative, Taxpayer contended that the Taxpayer's actual return filed prior to

the e11.piration of three years from the due date should supersede or amend any "deemed
claim" and be given effect for purposes of determining compliance with the statute of
limitations. (TP Br. 18-20). The refusal of the IRS to honor Taxpayer's return for purposes

3

of tl1e statute of limitations is inconsistent with rules of statutory construction approved by the
Tax Court. (TP Br. 19). It is also inconsistent with the Tax Court's recent holding in
Millsap v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 926, (1988). The issues and the equities of that case were very
similar to the issues in the case before this Court and the taxpayer prevailed. (TP Br. 18-20).
The IRS fai1ed to distinguish the principles in Millsap from the principles that ought to
be a·Jplied in this case. The issue of whether a taxpayer's actual return can replace a
substitute or "deemed" document prepared or generated by the IRS and thereby obtain rights
to which he or she was otherwise entitled is of great significance. It is therefore quite
frustrating that the IRS did not address this issue. The IRS stated that Taxpayer's arguments
are rneritless, (IRS Br. 20) presumably referring to all of them. Its failure to address this
issue at all demonstrates that this blanket statement is bravado and a substitute for serious
cons·.deration of the issues. Taxpayer submits that the only logical conclusion is that the IRS
does not have a response that would be convincing to this Court.
The IRS Misstates the Leeislative History: The IRS repeatedly states that the plain
language of section 6512 means that the mailing of a notice of deficiency by the IRS
constitutes a "deemed claim" for refund filed by the Taxpayer. (IRS Br. 10, 13-16, 19,21).
The ·law in this conclusion is that there is no express reference in the statute to a "deemed
clairr .. " In fact, the Tax Court itself has interpreted this language as meaning nothing more
than that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to allow a refund if the taxpayer could have filed a
claim for refund on the date the notice of deficiency was issued. (TP Br. 13-14). In
Wheder. Sr.

v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1979-321, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236, 1238, T.C.M.

(P-H> 79, 321 (1979) the court articulated its interpretation of section 6512(b)(3)(B):
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Thus, it is not necessary that a refund claim actually he filed, hut only that a timely
claim could have been filed seeking recovery of the overpaid taxes at the time the
statutory notice was mailed, i.e., that the overpaid taxes were not yet barred for credit
or refund when the notice of deficiency was issued. (emphasis the Court's).
The Taxpayer contends that the legislative history supports the Wheeler interpretation.
(TP Br. 20-24) The response of the IRS (IRS Br. 23-27) is confused, incomplete and
misleading. The IRS accuses Taxpayer of basing his argument on the language and
legi!:lative history of section 322 of the 1939 Code, as originally enacted, and of ignoring the
194:! amendments to section 322. (IRS Br. 24). This is incorrect. Taxpayer's original brief
set forth in Addendum B (B 2-4) all relevant portions of section 322 as it appeared on the eve
of tl1e enactment of the 1954 Code and which, of course, reflected the 1942 amendments.
All of Taxpayer's references to section 322 were to the statute as amended.
Section 322(d), the predecessor of section 6512(h)(3)(B), provided in relevant part:
No such credit or refund shall he made of any portion of the tax unless the
Board2 detennines as part of its decision (I) that such portion was paid (A)
within two years before the filing of the claim, the mailing of the notice of
deficiency, or the execution of an agreement by hoth the Commissioner and the
taxpayer pursuant to section 276(b) to extend beyond the time prescribed in
section 275 the time within which the Commissioner might assess the tax,
whichever is earliest, or (B) within three years before the filing of the claim,
the mailing of the notice of deficiency, or the execution of the agreement,
whichever is earliest, if the claim was filed, the notice of deficiency mailed, or
the agreement executed within three years from the time the return was filed
by the taxpayer ...

There is nothing in this language that could remotely be considered to support a
"deemed claim" concept and a shorter statute of limitations for taxpayers who file a petition

2

The Board was the "Board of Tax Appeals" which was renamed the Tax Court in
1942. We will hereinafter substitute "Tax Court" for "Board" or "Board of Tax Appeal"
5

------

----··-·---~----------

in the Tax Court than tor taxpayers who tile a complaint in the district court. Certainly if
suet. a dramatic change in the jurisdiction of the Tax Court had been intended, the 1954
legdative history would have so stated when section 6512(b)(3)(B), the successor of section
322td) was enacted. Instead, the House Report contained a blanket statement that existing
law was being reenacted. (TP Br. 22-23, IRS Br. 26).
The language of section 6512(b)(3)(B) is somewhat different from 322(b):
(3) LIMIT ON AMOUNT OF CREDIT OR REFUND.-No such credit or refund shall be allowed or made of any
portion of the tax unless the Tax Court determines as part of its
decision that such portion was paid--

* * *
(B) within the period which would be applicable
under section 65ll(b)(2), (c), or (d), if on the date of the
mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed
(whether or not filed) stating the grounds upon which the Tax
Court finds that there is an overpayment. (Emphasis supplied.]
The Tax Court has never articulated what language in section 6512(b)(3)(B) forms the
basis for the "deemed claim" concept but it is presumably the highlighted portion. Whereas
the 1939 Code contained no language which would support a "deemed claim," it is arguable
that ·:he above language could. However, to find in this language a "deemed claim" concept
would require a strained construction and would also be inconsistent with the Tax Court's
own mandate to construe a statute in light of the overall statutory framework, the intent of
Con~;ress

and any acute

i~justice

to taxpayers and to seek harmony in the statutory network

even where the statutory language is clear.

Estate of Baumgardner v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.

445, 453 ( 1985). (TP Br. 31-32). Such a construction would also run counter to the 1942,
1954 and 1958 legislative history.

6

Taxpayer disagrees with the statement of the IRS (IRS Br. 24-27) that the 1942
amendments supports the position of the IRS. Indeed, an examination of the legislative
history accompanying the 1942 amendments strongly supports Taxpayer's interpretation.
H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 120-121 contained the tollowing explanation

regarding the amendments to section 322(d). predecessor to section 6512(b)(3)(B):
There have been some decisions to the effect that the petition referred
to in this provision of section 322(d) which limits the amount of the credit or
refund is not necessarily the petition which brings the case before the ITax
Court!, but is that petition or the amendment thereto which asserts the grounds
indicating the overpayment. Under these decisions the period of limitations
runs against the taxpayer, while the case is before the fTax Courtl, until the
taxpayer files his petition in which he asserts, or until he amends it to assert,
the grounds lon] which he c1aims an overpayment. In order to give the
taxpayer the privilege to claim an overpayment before the ITax Court! by such
amendments to his petitions as may be allowed under the rules of the !Tax
Court], without the period of limitations running against the refund of such
overpayment after the notice of deficiency is mailed, fsection 322(d) is
amended! to provide that the period of limitations which determines the portion
of the tax which may be credited or refunded is measured from the date the
notice of deficiency is mailed, rather than from the date the petition is filed.
This Report is illuminating in two regards. It illustrates an assumption by Congress
that 322(d) prior to amendment did not permit the IRS to shorten the taxpayer's limitation
peri< ><I by the mailing of a notice of deficiency. The taxpayer controlled the tolling of the
statute by filing a petition showing an overpayment. It also convincingly evidences a
congressional intent that the statute was amended to improve the taxpayer's situation. As
amer.ded, the mailing of the notice of deficiency tolls the running of the statute of limitations

wif.st the taxpayer. Any subsequent return/claim for refund or amendment thereto, filed by
the taxpayer is not time barred. Even if the grounds for the overpayment are discovered by
the 1 ax Court rather than the taxpayer, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to allow the refund.

7

Thi:; legislative history clearly indicates that section 322(d), and

it~

successor, section

651 2(b )(3 )(B) provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine a refund if a claim
for refund could have been filed on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. Its purpose
was to aid taxpayers, not to ensnare them in a trap.
This interpretation is consistent with that of a noted commentator who wrote a
defhitive history of the Tax Court, Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical
Ana~

(1979), cited by the United States Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit and, on

numerous occasions, by the Tax Court. In that text, Professor Dubroff reviews in detail the
hist<•ry of the Tax Court's refund jurisdiction. ld... at 414-27. With respect to the 1942
amendments, he first noted that in 1932 and 1934, the American Bar Association had
reco.mmended that since the statute of limitations on deficiencies tolled during the Tax Court
proc ~ing, there should be no time limitation on refund claims once the Tax Court's
jurisdiction (for determination of deficiencies) was properly invoked. M.. at 418. Congress
did rot accept the ABA position and a "more modest proposal" was accepted. ld... Prior to
the 1942 amendments, if a Tax Court petition was filed before a claim for refund, the time of
fitin~;

the petition controlled. J.d... A petition for this purpose was a petition that first alleged

an overpayment "(because ofJ a Supreme Court decision holding that, for statute of
limitations purposes, an amended claim for refund asserting a new and unrelated ground did
not rdate back to the date of filing of the original claim." 1Citation omitted. J ld... at 419. The
ABA took the position that since the Commissioner could amend his pleadings to assert a
greater deficiency through the time of trial, the taxpayer should have the same privilege. J.d...
Professor Dubroff reports the Congressional response as follows (p. 419):

8

In 1942, Congress agreed with the ABA objective and the statute was amended
to allow credit or refund if the mailing of the deticiency notice which resulted
in the !Tax Court] proceeding was within the statutory period of the
overpayment. !citing Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, ~ 169(b), 56 Stat. 877.1
Thus, whether or not the original petition claimed an overpayment, claim
therefor would not be time barred if such a claim could validly have been
made at the time of mailin~; ofthe deficiency notice. !Citing I.R.C. §
6512(bWIEmphasis supplied.!
This interpretation of sections 322(d) and 6512(b) is exactly the one espoused by the
Tax Court in Wheeler. supra, and avoids the hardship to taxpayers and the conflict with the
statutory framework in accordance with

Baum~:ardner.

supra.

To briefly summarize, Taxpayer reiterates that the predecessor of section 6512(b)(3),
section 322(d), contained no language which could remotely be considered to support a
"det~med

claim" concept or a shorter statute of limitations applicable to taxpayers who file a

petition in the Tax Court. In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Tax Court has
refu.1d jurisdiction if the Taxpayer could have filed a claim for refund on the date the notice
of d,~ficiency was mailed. Second, Congress expressly stated that it intended no material
changes in then existing law (section 322(d)) when it enacted section 6512(b)(3)(B). Since
Congress did not intend to change the substantive rules, the only rational conclusion is that
the Tax Court has jurisdiction under section 6512, as it did under section 322 of the 1939
Cod( to determine Taxpayer's refund.
The IRS l&nores the 1958 Lea:islative History: Taxpayer's original brief contained
refer·!nces to and quotes from legislative history accompanying two 1958 tax bills (TP Br. 20-

3

The reference to section 6512(b) instead of its predecessor, section 322(d), was
.
presumably made in light of his recognition that Congress intended no substantive change
when it enacted the 1954 Code.

9

24) which contained express language indicating congressional understanding and intent that
the rights of the Commissioner to assess deficiencies and the right of taxpayers to claim
refi1nds be correlative; they each have three years. It is telling that the IRS devoted a
sub;tantial portion of its brief (IRS Br. 24-26) to the 1942 legislative history hut completely
ignc 1red the 1958 legislative history.
The IRS Is Attemptim: to Mislead this Court as to the Existence of a
L:~HII:Standin&

Administrative Practice of Grantin& Refunds to Taxpayers who File a

R.etllm/Ciaim for Refund Within Three Years of the Due Date:

The Taxpayer is hy

turns angered, amused and bemused hy the brief of the IRS. The IRS dismisses, in a
footnote and the last one at that, the Taxpayer's frustration at being caught in the switches.
It is simply outrageous for the IRS to say that it is "a figment of his imagination" that

the ::RS has changed it<> interpretation of the statute. Allen

v.

Comm'r was the first case,

after more than a half century of interpretation of the statute, in which a taxpayer who filed
his •1r her return within three years of the due date of that return and who reported an
overpayment was denied a refund in the Tax Court. (Allen v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 475 (1992)
aff'c, No. 93-1329, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis (6th Cir. April 13, 1994}}. (TP Br. 26-27).
Sine~

then, there has been a veritable explosion of additional cases. (TP Br. 27).
What the rest of the world treats as a fact, (that a taxpayer has three years in which to

claim the refund of an overpayment) is dismissed hy the IRS as a "figment."

Only a handful

of ta" law professors and a few tax lawyers that specialize in procedure are aware of the fact
that 1here has been a change in the way this procedural rule is being interpreted by the IRS
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and the Tax Court. The statute has for a11 intento; and purposes remained unchanged tor over
fif1.y years. Why are these cases just beginning to percolate up now'!
Was it a " .. .tigment of Ithe Taxpayer's) imagination ... ". that the IRS appeals officer
tre.1ted his return as valid even though it was filed after the IRS issued a notice of deficiency?
(TP Br. 25). If there is no long standing administrative practice, why did the Internal
Re·tenue Service Center send the Taxpayer a letter telling him that his check was in the mail'!
Wtty did the original answer by the IRS to the Taxpayer's petition treat his tax return as if it
were valid'! (TP Br. 25). For that matter, why did the very attorneys who wrote the brief
tor the IRS in the case before this Court, tell the Seventh Circuit that "Section 6512(b)(3)(B)
thu:; seeks to place Taxpayers who seek a refund of an overpayment in the Tax Court in the
same position as if they had brought a refund suit in the district court"'! (TP Br. C26).
All of the information furnished to the public by the IRS advises Taxpayer's to file
within three years in order to obtain a refund. There is simply no way that a pro se taxpayer
could know that they must not respond to the invitation in the notice of deficiency to file a
petition in the Tax Court.
It is most ungracious for the IRS to charge the Taxpayer with an overactive
"im.tgination." The Taxpayer is entitled to an explanation on how the IRS can be telling the
genc!ral public one thing and telling this Court another. The IRS has made no attempt to
explain all of the articles, IRS press releases and publications contained in Addendum C to
the Taxpayer's opening Brief. Found in the Addendum is the type of information on which
the general public relies and on which the Taxpayer relied. It is also indicative of the IRS'
Iong;;tanding administrative practice. The Commissioner and other high-ranking IRS officials
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ob·,iously believe that such a practice exists. What other possible explanation could account
for their representations to the public? Should we ascribe an intent to deceive taxpayers on
the part of the Commissioner and the other IRS officials, who have communicated to the
public the existence of a three-year period in which to file return/claims without warning of a
Ies:;er period in the Tax Court? Taxpayer has included page after page of admissions by the
IR~;

that it treats the statute of limitations as being three years. The IRS has not offered an

example of a single communication to the public that warns of the trap in which they will be
ensnared if they follow the IRS' advice.
The IRS notes that, alternatively, a taxpayer can recover his refund by filing his
return within three years and filing a refund suit in a district court. However, most taxpayers
are uneducated in the subtleties of Tax Court jurisdiction and have no idea that when they file
a P'!tition in the Tax Court they are forfeiting their refund. Moreover, as noted above, the
IR~

has actively publicized a three-year limitation on filing for refunds without even an

asttrisk warning that the "three" might be "two" if a petition is filed in the Tax Court. The
notice of deficiency contains no such warning nor do the IRS publications directed to
taxpayers as assistance. This is nothing more than a trap for the unwary.
The IRS is playing a semantical she11 game with Taxpayers. By not admitting that the
IRS has suddenly changed its position, they avoid the responsibility of explaining why the
change has been made. The brief of the IRS is larded with string citations to Tax Court
authority but no real analysis of the correctness of that authority. Little space is devoted to
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re~;ponding

to Taxpayer's arguments. Taxpayer deserves a bona tide response to his well-

co.lsidered arguments. This Court deserves a serious response as well.
The
.tru~

Lon~standina=

Administrative Practice of the IRS has been Incorporated into

Code Under the Lea:;islatiye Reenactment Doctrine: The Taxpayer contends that the

remactment of the Code without reversal of the IRS' longstanding administrative practice
be:;peaks congressional approval and under the legislative reenactment rule, this practice
acquires the force of law as if it had been incorporated into the Code. (TP Br. 28). This is
a ('articularly appropriate situation to apply the legislative reenactment rule because the
legislative history indicates that Congress was aware that if a taxpayer filed a claim within
three years, the refund would be granted as a matter of course. (TP Br. 20-24). The IRS
ha~:

not deigned to respond to this contention and make its views known to this Court.
IRS Has Failed to Explain Its Lack of Consistent Treatment; Taxpayer contends

that the IRS has a duty to treat similarly situated taxpayers consistently or explain the reason
for the inconsistent treatment. (TP Br. 28-30). An administrative agency must either follow
its own precedents or explain why it departs from them. (TP Br. 28-30). The IRS has not
deigned to respond to this contention and make its views known to this Court.
The Statute Should Not be Construed in Such a Manner that the Period for
Clnimin~

Refunds is Shorter in the Tax Court than in the Other Courts Havine Refund

.l.u!isdiction: Taxpayer has vigorously contended throughout this litigation that Congress
em: ld not and did not intend that a taxpayer, who files a petition in the Tax Court, have a
shorter statute of limitation for filing refund claims than taxpayers who file in the district
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wurt or the Claims Court. (TP Br. 30-33) Taxpayer's brief contained case law authority
(TP Br. 30-33) and legislative history (TP Br. 20-24) in support of this proposition.
The IRS' response (IRS Br. 27-30) to this argument is that perfect symmetry between
th ~ Tax Court and the district court is not required. Taxpayer agrees that there are some
variations in the jurisdiction of and litigation before these courts but the differences that do
exist are the result of explicit statutory direction. Section 651 1 is the statute of limitations for
all taxpayers, regardless of the forum selected. There is no statutory provision stating that a
dil'ferent rule should apply in the Tax Court.

The IRS maintains that the plain language of

sedion 6513(b)(3)(B) creates a difference in the Tax Court jurisdiction. (IRS Br. 28). The
IRS repeatedly represents to this Court that the "plain language" of section 6512(b)(3 )(B)
relJuires this unjust result, as if by repetition the statement will become true. Giving the IRS
the: most favorable reading, the language is ambiguous. Rules of statutory construction
re,tuire that ambiguous language be resolved in light of the equities and consistency with the
statutory framework and legislative history. Baumi:ardner, supra, at 451.
The IRS position in this case is inconsistent with its position espoused in the Seventh
Ci:·cuit. In Galuska v. Comm'r, 5 F.3d 195 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'g. 98 T.C. 661 (1991), the
IRS persuaded the Court that it was only seeking the same result in the Tax Court that the
taJ~payer

would have obtained had he filed in the district court. The IRS brief (TP Br. C26)

contained the following representation to the Seventh Circuit:
The Tax Court is authorized under Section 6512(b)(l) of the Internal
Revenue Code to determine whether a taxpayer has made an overpayment of
tax for any taxable year before it, Section 6512(b)(3)(B) provides, in effect,
however, that no portion of any such overpayment determined by the Tax
Court shall be refunded to the taxpayer to the extent the taxpayer would have
been precluded under Section 651 l(b)(2) from obtaining a refund had he filed
14

suit in the District Court. Section 65 J2(b)(3)(B> thus seeks to place taxpayers
who seek a refund of an overpayment in the Tax Court in the same position as
if they bad brou~ht a refund suit in the district court. 1Emphasis supplied.!
The Seventh Circuit was clearly unaware that it was being induced to write an opinion
that would be subsequently cited as authority for the disparate treatment of the Taxpayer
sought here by the IRS. The Court there was dealing with a taxpayer who did not file his
return until after three years had elapsed. If the taxpayer in Galuska had, as in the instant
ca ie, filed his return/claim for refund within three years of the due date of his return, the
Seventh Circuit would have ruled that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to allow a refund. This
conclusion is evidenced by the following statement of the Court:
In view of section 6512(b)(3), a taxpayer who asks the
Tax Court for a refund of an overpayment is treated the same as
if he had brought a refund suit in the district court, so that there
is no advantage in choosing one forum over the other. 5 F .3d. at
196, n.l.
The IRS convinced the Seventh Circuit to write an opinion that it obviously believed
die nothing more than require consistent treatment for taxpayers in the Tax Court and the
district court. The IRS now has the temerity to use that opinion as its main authority here
(IRS Br. 7, 10, 15-19, 21-23) to support confiscation of Taxpayer's refund which concededly
(IRS Br. 29) would have been available to him had he brought a refund suit in the district
court. The IRS was less than candid with the Seventh Circuit and is being less than candid
with this Court.
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The IRS comments on this issue (IRS Br. 30) conclude with an observation that
although the result that Taxpayer here can not recover a refund that might4 have been
recoverable had he brought a suit in the district court, that is simply a consequence of a
complicated statutory scheme in which perfect symmetry is not achievable. With respect to
the statute of limitations for claiming refunds, not only is symmetry achievable, it has been
achieved. The Galuska opinion proceeds on the assumption that it has been achieved, as does
the IRS' brief in the Seventh Circuit. In its constant avoidance of a serious discussion of the
is:;ues, the IRS breaches its obligation to give the Taxpayer and this Court a good reason for
d(nying his refund.

The Code Should Not be Construed in a Manner which Results in an Arbitrary

rutd Capricious Application of the Statute of Limitations: Taxpayer pointed out that the
re~ult

sanctioned by the Tax Court will apply fortuitously and capriciously. (TP Br. 34-35).
First, if the notice of deficiency is mailed before the expiration of two years from the

dl e date the taxpayer will recover a refund no matter how late the return is filed or even if
nc· return is filed. (TP Br. 34, IRS Br. 28, n.IO). The IRS indirectly chides those
iniividuals, such as Taxpayer, who ti1e their returns after two but before three years, (IRS

Br. 29) implying that their culpability justifies forfeiture of their refund. But if the computer
generates a notice of deficiency before the expiration of two years, the IRS admits that the
ta:~payer

will receive his or her refund no matter how many years late the taxpayer files or

even if no return

is~

filed. (IRS Br. 28, n.IO). Thus, the application of the limitation

4

hi~

On page 29 of its brief the IRS states that such a taxpayer "can," not "might," recover
•
overpayment.
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p1!riod has no consistent relationship to the conduct or culpability of the taxpayer. This
cHpricious application of the tax laws simply does not make sense.
If the IRS computer generates a notice of deficiency between two and three years from

the due date, an even more capricious application of the statute of limitations occurs. If the
ta !(payer files a petition in the Tax Court, the practical result of the IRS' interpretation of
section 6512(b)(3)(B) is that each day during that period (the date the notice is mailed) is
pc·tentially a statute of limitations.

To illustrate, following is a list of recent cases and the

ef·ective statute of limitations applicable to the taxpayers: 2 years, 18 days, Braman v.
Qtmm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-636, T.C.M. (P-H) 92,636 (1992); 2 years, 22 days, Rossman
Y.....Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-351, T.C.M. (P-H) 93,351 (1993); 2 years, I month, 7 days,
fi)tronik-Holder v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 374 (1993); 2 years, 1 month, 10 days, Dyball v.
Q;mm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-76, T.C.M. (P-H) 94,076 (1994); 2 years, 4 months, 27 days,
.Qavison

v.

Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-709, T.C.M. (P-H) 92,709 (1992); 2 years, 5

mc·nths, 11 days, Lundy
(1~'93)(this

y,

Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-278, T.C.M. (P-H) 93,278

case); 2 years, 6 months, 7 days, Richards v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-102,

T.C.M. (P-H) 93,102 (1993); 2 years, 6 months, 16 days, Phillips v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
19m-284, T.C.M. (P-H) 93,284 (1993); 2 years, 7 months, 1 day, DipJacido y, Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-169, T.C.M. (P-H) 93, 169; 2 years, 8 months, 13 days, Kicza v.
CuJnm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-115, T.C.M. (P-H) 94,115 (1994); and 2 years, 11 months, 26
days, Raczkie:wicz v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-617, T.C.M. (P-H) 93,617 (1993).
Again, this capricious application of the statute of limitations makes no sense. The
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stitute is ambiguous at best. It should not he construed in such a manner that Congress could
not have possibly intended.
The IRS' response is that this fickle application of the tax laws is beside the point and
Ciln he avoided by filing a return within two years of the due date. (IRS Br. 28-29). This
totally capricious and/or arbitrary application of the statute is not "beside the point." A
st1tute should he construed in such a manner so as to make sense. The response of the IRS
al:;o fails to deal with the pointed questions posed by Taxpayer: Could Congress have
intended a construction that would permit 365 statutes of limitation? Could Congress have
intended that the IRS have the unilateral ability to shorten a taxpayer's time in which to file a
claim tor refund simply by mailing a notice of deficiency'! Could Congress have intended the
"roor man's court" to be employed to make poor men poorer?
Finally, the IRS statement that the three-year statute of limitations can only be
pr~served

by filing a claim tor refund within two years speaks for itself.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in Taxpayers original brief, the
decision of the trial judge should be reversed with directions to enter an order detennining
I he amount of the overpayment due the Taxpayer.
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